Grutter v. Bollinger

JUSTICES SADY, MINERD, HANSON

OPINION WRITTEN BY SADY, MINERD, HANSON

Decision:

I.

The University of Michigan Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in the admissions process, devised in a manner that utilizes educational benefits from a diverse student body, is a compelling state interest and is not prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause in the 14^th Amendment.

Our ruling upholds this court’s decision in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Baake. This case is comparable to the admissions policies tended to in the Baake case. Powell’s powerful statement in his decision in Baake remains true that: “[the] nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation.” This Court finds Justice Powell’s opinion still relevant to institutions using race-conscience admissions policies. The court also shares his view that working to achieve a diverse student body is a compelling state interest in regards to university admissions.

The application process used by the University of Michigan Law School remains within an acceptable limitation of affirmative action doctrines set by this Court. We are convinced that the Law School has consciously and critically determined the benefits that a diverse student body can have in an educational setting. Furthermore, it is also apparent through expert testimony that affording educational and professional opportunities to underrepresented minors will create future leaders with more robust skills and ideas for society as a whole.

The admissions process of the Law School fits into a narrowly tailored plan similar to the plan Harvard University used to set the standard for the acceptability of race-conscience programs. From the Baake decision, a program cannot: “insulate each category of applicants with certain desired qualifications from competition with all other applicants.” Instead, it must be: “flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight.” The University of Michigan’s Law School application program does not put candidates on separate admissions tracks based on race, nor does it set quotas for members of certain racial or ethnic groups. The application does not place race as the defining feature, and the review process takes a very holistic approach to accepting candidates in considering all benefits an applicant might bring to the university’s program.

It is also important to understand that there is no policy of automatic acceptance or rejection based on any of the university’s “soft variables.” These “soft variables” allow the admissions personnel to look at each individual applicant and take many factors into consideration as assessing an “applicant’s likely contributions to the intellectual and social life of the institution.” Race is one of many factors the Law School uses to make this determination. The method used by the University of Michigan’s Law School fits this Court’s guidelines for a tailored program seeking to achieve the goal of diversity.

Petitioners use of statistics in this case seem somewhat misleading, especially when the argument indicates that “soft variables” were considered as well as test and GPA scores. Indeed, a non-minority student with lower test and GPA scores may be accepted over a minority applicant with better scores because of these soft factors. Were race the sole factor that determined an applicant’s diversity worth, a claim to illegality on constitutional grounds would be more founded. The attainment of a “critical mass” does not create an unconstitutional advantage for some minority applicants over others, but simply allows the university to create its diverse student body in a way still within the guidelines established in Bakke.

The University of Michigan’s law school policy of using numerous types of “plus factors” does not constitute a quota system. There is no evidence presented in this case that demonstrates an undeniable goal by the Law School of achieving a specific number of minority students. While the appellant has given us numerous statistics on this matter, there still remains a lack of conclusive findings that the admissions for the Law School was admitting a specific set quota of minority students. It must also be recognized that this data also affirms that different years showed different numbers for minority students in general, thus, no set quota is being used or achieved at the Law School.

There is also a difference between keeping a set number of spots open to only minority students, and using a “plus factor” when viewing different applications. What is also notable is the fact that these “plus factors” can be received in many different areas, not just race. Because these pluses are awarded in different areas apart from race (such as for gender, etc.), and because they constitute “soft variables”, we believe that these pluses would not go as far as to admit those students who are clearly under par for the general terms of acceptance at the school.

II.

If it was evident that students who would not otherwise have been accepted on merit were getting accepted on race alone, the use of Michigan’s system would be deemed unconstitutional. However, as long as this not the case, we view this system as a legal means to pursue a diverse student body. As the Respondent stated in his brief to the court: “…the minimum holding of Bakke is that race can be a factor in admissions in order to achieve the compelling interest of a diverse student body, which is deemed key to educational advancement.” The use of the “plus factor” is clearly very narrowly tailored to representing one of numerous possible “soft factors” while still attempting to attain its goal of justly pursuing a diverse student body. Thus, the University of Michigan’s Law School admissions is narrowly tailored in its use of race as a plus factor and not the use of quotas, just as Harvard’s Law School admissions was found to be in the Bakke case.

We also understand and believe that the University of Michigan’s Law School operates their race-conscious program in the present societal context, in which discrimination is an unfortunate reality. Ideally one would like to believe that all people can be viewed on the same level playing ground and appreciated for their individual experiences, solely on the content of what those experiences are and how they developed. However, no one can deny there is still racism in this nation today. As a result of the color of their skin, some people will never have the same opportunities as others. Thus, admissions programs may be tailored to acknowledge these deficiencies in our nation and work to provide diverse environments from which students can better their education.

While racism exists, it is necessary that there be some kind of acknowledgment of these inequities in our country. Thus, it is necessary that the University of Michigan’s Law School be allowed to pursue ways in which its student body can become diverse for the benefit of all individuals involved. This of course needs to be done in a manner that does not neglect the constitutional rights of other students. That is why it is essential that this program is not constructed with the use of quotas. The respondent in this case has done a sufficient job in convincing this court that this in not the case with regard to the University of Michigan Law School’s admission process.

III.

While we affirm the University of Michigan admission process to achieve diversity, we also believe that admission policies would violate the 14^th amendment if they admitted unqualified candidates over qualified applicants and further if they admitted those who demonstrate substantially inferior qualifications to others that they do not admit. This is not a hard and fast rule especially when “objective” numbers from scores such as the LSAT or GPA’s are not the only factor in determining who should be admitted. But, until such demonstration can be made in the case of specific individuals utilizing the various criteria established by a school for admission, and no such sufficient argument has been presented in this case, an admission policy is constitutional.

As the respondent pointed out in his brief in regard to the Bakke case: “The majority of the court then went on to affirm that Harvard College’s admissions policy, which articulate[d] no remedial purpose, but was rather solely justified by the need to assemble a diverse student body [and] was [found to be] constitutional and properly devised.” This court in the case of Grutter v. Bollinger upholds the Bakke decision, and finds that the appeal for the reversal of the Sixth Circuit decision be denied. It is so decided.