Ryan Valaas

3/8/04

Argument in Law & Politics

 

 

United States of America, Respondent, v. Ines Herrara Martinez, Appellant.

 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

 

PRIOR HISTORY: Appeals from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit.

 

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

 

COUNSEL: For United States of America, Plaintiff – Appellee: Brandon Biddle.  For Ines Herrara Martinez, Defendant – Appellant: Charlie Klein.

 

JUDGES: Chief Justice Hanson, Associate Justice Valaas, Associate Justice Ross.  Associate Justice LAY dissenting.

 

OPINION: Associate Justice Valaas dissenting

 

In this case, Oxner pulled Martinez over because his right tires crossed the fog line not because of his “racial” motivations.  Oxner, in his official opinion, felt this constituted a traffic violation under South Dakota Statute.  Any traffic violation provides probable cause to stop a vehicle.  In United States v. Pereira-Munoz, 59 F.3d 788, 791 (8th Cir. 1995), that court stated that “it is well established that any traffic violation, no matter how minor, provides a police officer with probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle.”  The relevant clause of the South Dakota Statue says “On a roadway divided into lanes, a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and may not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety” S.D. Codified Laws 32-26-6.  The appellant claims that “the state code is obviously in place to apprehend intoxicated or otherwise incapable drivers, and not punish those whose actions are so minor and isolated.” (Appellant Brief 1st argument).  If this were true, would people be allowed to speed a couple miles over the posted speed limit without getting stopped?  Would they be allowed to drive 10 miles over the speed limit without being stopped?  I’d estimate that the vast majority of people who get pulled over for speeding are neither intoxicated or incapable drivers.  South Dakota Statute declares that speeding, even 1 mile over the posted limit, is a misdemeanor just like not staying entirely within a single lane ‘as nearly as practicable’ is a misdemeanor.  Thus, I concur with the lower courts’ determination that the stop was supported by probable cause.

The appellant argues that Oxner selectively applied the South Dakota Statute against him because he was Hispanic.  When examining the specifics of the stop, it must be kept in mind that an officer’s motivation or state of mind is irrelevant as long as he is staying within the scope of his authority.  Even if Oxner did believe that Martinez was carrying drugs based on his ethnicity, it was still perfectly legal for him to pull Martinez over due to the traffic violation.  “So long as the officer is doing nothing more than he is legally permitted and objectively authorized to do, his actual state of mind is irrelevant for purposes of determining the lawfulness of the stop.  Bloomfield, 40 F. 3d at 915; Cummins, 902 F. 2d at 501 & n.3.  Based on Bloomfield, I don’t consider Oxner’s state of mind relevant in this case, only whether there was a traffic violation.  The important thing to remember in this case is that Oxner followed the law.  Martinez was stopped because of a traffic violation, not because of any state of mind that Oxner held, and thus his constitutional rights were not violated.

After this, the Appellant’s argument falls apart.  The Appellant relies on the false assumption that the traffic stop was based soley on the fact that the driver was Hispanic.  Clearly, Oxner pulled Martinez over after and because of the traffic violation.  The appellant, in his brief, contends that “the officer first selected the vehicle from the highway based purely on the knowledge that the occupants were hispanic” yet concedes that “following a vehicle does not violate any law or constitutional guarantee.”

The appellant also argues that the dog sniff and subsequent search violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  United States v. Linkous, 285 F.3d 716, 719-21 (8th Cir. 2002) clearly states that “A short detention for a dog sniff after a completion of a traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”

After the dog sniff, Oxner had more evidence to believe that Martinez was carrying drugs.  The dog was alerted, indicating that it sensed drugs somewhere.  This gave Oxner reasonable cause to search the vehicle himself.  The facts of the case state that Oxner “searched the vehicle, observing certain suspicious things such as areas where screws had been removed and replaced.” United States v. Martinez, 354 F.3d 932, 2004.  The key here is that Oxner observed certain suspicious things.  This evidence provided Oxner further incentive to investigate which he did by calling the Border Patrol.

Although the law and this judge clearly side with the respondent, if the decision was hypothetically reversed, the implications would fundamentally change the scope and power that police officers have.  Although the decision may initially only encompass a narrow class of actions, specifically traffic stops, the trend would undoubtedly reverberate into other aspects of law enforcement.  Would the racial profiling card give minorities undue special protection from the law via the precedent that this reversal would establish?  Clearly Oxner stopped Martinez on a traffic violation, albeit minor, and followed lawful procedure throughout the stop.  There was no error in his actions and his thorough questioning was not inappropriate or invasive.  Questioning Oxner’s actions in this case by reversing the decision, would severely weaken police officer’s capabilities and could open a floodgate of litigation related to the questionable legality of each traffic stop involving a minority.  Although racial profiling is an important issue that needs to be supported addressed, this is not the case for it.

 

I affirm the judgment of the lower courts.