MARTINEZ, Defendant – Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Plaintiff – Respondent

 

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

 

COUNSIL:     Charlie Klein for Defendant – Appellant

                        Brandon Biddle for Plaintiff – Respondent

 

JUDGES:       Before HANSON, ROSS, and VALAAS

 

OPINION:

 

ROSS, Justice with whom Justice Hanson concurs.

 

I.          BACKGROUND

 

            On April 8, 2002, Trooper Matt Oxner passed a vehicle with two Hispanic occupants (Martinez and Cortez-Gomez) and California license plates traveling eastbound on a South Dakota interstate.  Upon witnessing the vehicle, Oxner turned his patrol vehicle around and followed the vehicle for approximately five miles before observing the right tires momentarily cross the fog-line on the road.  Oxner used this minor breach to pull the vehicle over, approached Martinez and requested his driver’s license, registration and insurance information, which were all produced, properly in order.  Oxner then told Martinez to follow him back to his patrol car while questioning him about the vehicle and his purpose in South Dakota; Martinez complied.  Oxner informed Martinez that he was going to walk his drug dog around the vehicle.  The dog was alerted, and Oxner began to search the car.  Oxner was unable to find any controlled substances in the car, but did note some “suspicious screws” in the backseat.  When the search came up empty, Oxner continued questioning the defendants while contacting Border Patrol to check on their immigration status.  After roughly an hour, the Border Patrol ordered Oxner to take the defendants into custody, and the vehicle was impounded.  Later, 4,931.9 grams of cocaine were found concealed in packages inside the vehicle’s back seat. 

 

II.        PULLING OVER THE CAR

 

            Defendant Ines Herrara Martinez claims that State Trooper Matt Oxner’s intentions were based upon a preconceived racial bias rather than an effort to serve and protect.  We concur that Oxner’s actions were misguided by what has become known as “racial profiling” and what this court views as an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the 4th, 14th and 15th amendments of the Constitution.

The 4th Amendment of the Constitution explicitly states that “the right of the people to be secure in their persona, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  Furthermore, section 1 of the 14th Amendment states that “no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  The 15th amendment further emphasizes that rights granted to citizens cannot be taken away by the government on account of race by stating that “the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”  What these three amendments tell us is that utilization of the racial profiling technique of selective law enforcement is grossly unconstitutional.  The protected rights against unwarranted search and seizure outlined in the 4th amendment must be protected equally for all citizens, regardless of race.

By examining the events that occurred prior to Oxner pulling over the defendant’s vehicle, it is clear that racial profiling played a key role.  The events occurred during broad daylight on a major interstate in South Dakota.  It would not be a stretch of imagination to assume that there were many other vehicles on the road.  Nevertheless, Oxner thought it prudent to pull a “180” and follow the defendant’s vehicle for five miles without any other information than the occupants were Hispanic, the vehicle’s out-of-state license plates, and a preconceived “hunch” that there might be drug traffickers in the area.  Counsel for Martinez claims that “Oxner himself explicitly stated that his reasoning for even pursuing the defendants was because of this preconceived bias.” (Martinez v. United States, Brief for Defendant-Appellant)  This cannot be condoned constitutionally as proper police procedure.

After the five mile interim, Oxner observed one, isolated incident of the defendant’s tires momentarily crossing the fog-line.  The relevant South Dakota statute states that on “a roadway divided into lanes, a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane.” (S.L. Codified Laws § 32-26-6, emphasis added).  A police officer who pulls a car over for one, isolated incident of this degree of severity after five miles of intense scrutiny clearly has wavered the “as nearly as practicable” clause of this law.  If we allow such police behavior to be commonplace, what is to prevent another officer from following a “suspicious” car for 10 miles, or 50 miles?  Given enough time, every driver will commit a minor infraction, such as crossing a fog line.  By setting the precedent that police can single out vehicles and follow them for as long as they feel is prudent, we are basically giving the police carte blanche to pull over whomever they choose.  This is especially dangerous if police use racial profiling as an identifier of “suspicious vehicles.”  

While it is true that Whren v. United States states that an “individual officer's motivation is irrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes when there is probable cause for a stop,” that decision also noted that “selective enforcement of laws may violate Equal Protection.” 517 U.S. 806, 813, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) One, isolated minor infraction cannot possibly be considered probable cause in this circumstance, and thus, Oxner’s motivation is relevant because it established the only reason given for the search of Martinez’s car.  Furthermore, Oxner chose to single out Martinez’s car and scrutinize his driving, waiting for an excuse to pull him over.  Thus, it is clear that Oxner utilized selective enforcement based on racial profiling to target Martinez’s car.  Oxner’s abuse of selective enforcement violated Martinez’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

 

III.       THE DRUG DOG SNIFF AND OXNER’S SEARCH

 

            Defendant Martinez claims that there was not probable cause for Oxner to search the defendant’s vehicle, and thus his rights, as protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, were violated.  

Regarding the constitutionality of the dog sniff, the Plaintiff-Respondent’s brief claims that “a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justified further investigation.”  This seems incongruous with the facts of the case, which state that Martinez complied with all of the officer’s requests after the initial stop.  This court has ruled that “if…no answers are inconsistent and no objective circumstances supply the trooper with additional suspicion, the trooper should not expand the scope of the stop.” United States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1163 (8th Cir. 1994) Therefore, there was no probable cause for Oxner to perform a drug dog sniff.  Even Oxner’s claim of finding “suspicious screws” (which could be the result of numerous causes) occurred after the initial drug search had taken place.  Clearly, Oxner’s only reason for performing the search was his admitted “hunch” that out-of-state, Hispanic drivers may be trafficking controlled substances.

Counsel for the Plaintiff-Respondent cites United States v. Linkous (2002) as precedent to consider the dog sniff constitutional.  However, the Linkous case involved a situation in which there was “reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”  Here, there was no such reasonable suspicion; Martinez answered all of Oxner’s questions, and produced all proper documentation upon request.  Furthermore, prior to conducting the dog sniff, Oxner informed Martinez that the use of drug dogs were a routine part of normal traffic stops.  However, once under oath, Oxner testified that this was only the second time he had used the drug dog technique on the job, and it is not standard procedure for South Dakota State Troopers to use said methods on traffic stops of such minimal severity.  Here, Oxner abused his power as a police officer by misrepresenting the law to Martinez.  Oxner’s disregard of the law in this particular instance causes me to believe that he disregarded the law for the entirety of the incident.  Regardless of whether or not Oxner is able to justify his actions by pointing his finger at vague terms like “probable cause,” and “reasonable suspicion,” it is very clear that his actions at the time were solely influenced by an unfair and unconstitutional racial bias.

 

 

 

 

IV.       OPPOSING ARGUMENTS

 

            Counsel for the United States claims that “the officer’s state of mind is irrelevant as long as there is no violation of the law.  Police have the right of scrutiny and are given wide latitude to investigate cases as they see fit under the law.” (Martinez v. United States, Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent)  Among the most troublesome clauses in such a statement are “wide latitude” and “as they see fit.”  Such vague statements allow for police to become vigilantes and then later defend themselves by claiming that racial profiling and unwarranted searches were measures “they saw fit” for minor traffic violations.  If an elderly white woman with South Dakota license plates committed the exact same infraction, would she be treated in the same manor?  Clearly not, as even Oxner admitted that a “hunch” led him to pull over Martinez’s vehicle and that this instance was only the second time he had ordered a dog sniff.  Allowing officers this much leeway to selectively enforce the law on the basis of race clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.    

            Counsel for the United States also suggests that there is “no evidence of either selective enforcement or excessive scrutiny” in this case.  (Martinez v. United States, Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent)  If following a singled-out vehicle for five miles, waiting for a minor infraction to occur is not “selective enforcement or excessive scrutiny,” we ask the counsel for the United States to demonstrate what is. 

            Furthermore, the fact that illegal contraband was found does not justify the means by which it was acquired.  The Fourth Amendment "guarantee of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to the innocent and guilty alike." McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453, 93 L. Ed. 153, 69 S. Ct. 191 (1948).  The ends does not justify the means when it comes to police officers selectively enforcing the law. 

 

V.        CONCLUSION

 

            Oxner’s conduct during this incident violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment protection against unwarranted search and seizure and Fourteenth Amendment rights regarding equal protection.  Racial profiling and selective application of the law are inexcusable behaviors unbecoming of a police officer, whose duty should be to serve and protect, not single out and harass.  The contraband seized from this incident should be rendered inadmissible, and the decision of the lower court should be reversed.

 

 

Justices Morgan Ross; with Jim Hanson