PELMAN v. MCDONALDS
DISPOSITION: Denied in part, Affirmed in
part.
JUDGES: Authored by Ryan Piela and John
Henry Heckendorn, with whom Chief Justice Jim Hanson joins in part, dissenting
in part.
ASHLEY
PELMAN et. al., Appellants v. MCDONALD”S CORP., Respondent
HANSON
SUPREME COURT
October
25, 2003, Filed
PRIOR
HISTORY: Appeal from U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket No.
03-9010. Date Decided: January 25, 2005.
COUNSEL:
For Appellant(s): Joe L. Wheeler, Eugene, OR.
For
Respondent(s): Josh R. Meuth Alldredge, Pullman, WA.
Piela and Heckendorn join in
all parts of this decision.
Hanson dissents from sections D
and E.
A.) FACTS OF THE CASE: The
Plaintiffs sued The McDonalds Corporation on the grounds that the company
intentionally misled consumers about the health information of McDonalds’
products through false advertisements. According to the Plaintiffs, the
consequences of McDonald’s consumption may have included declining health,
coronary heart disease, and weight gain. The Respondent denies any liability
involved with the Plaintiffs’ decisions to consume the corporation’s food
products. Respondent claims and Appellant rejects that pursuant to the Attorney
General agreement, the corporation provides enough information to consumers to
make a conscientious decision about their consumption.
B. PELMAN CAUSATION:
It is true that Jazlen Bradley and Ashley
Pelman, the Plaintiffs in this case, are overweight and unhealthy. The
Plaintiffs have also proven that obesity is connected to other health problems
such as diabetes, coronary heart disease and early death as noted in Pelman v.
McDonald's 02 Civ. 7821, 2003. However, the Plaintiffs’ obesity and health problems
have not been connected sufficiently to McDonalds’ food. The Plaintiffs failed
to address the presence of other factors within their lives that could have
caused the obesity and health concerns. As such, the Plaintiffs failed to
isolate McDonalds as the primary cause of their health problems. In fact,
McDonalds only made up 1/7th of Jazlen Bradley and Ashley Pelman’s diets. The
Plaintiffs “allegedly only ate 5 meals
at McDonald’s per week” Josh Alldredge,
Brief for the Respondent, 2009. This leaves a vast amount of the
Plaintiffs’ consumption, as well as their other nutritional and exercise
practices, under question. As the Second Circuit court noted: “what else did
the plaintiffs eat? How much did they exercise? Is there a family history[?],” Pelman v. McDonald's, 02 Civ. 7821, 2003.
In order to prove that McDonalds was the causal factor, “the Complaint must
address these other variables and, if possible, eliminate them or show that a
McDiet is a substantial factor despite these other variables” Pelman v. McDonald's, 02 Civ. 7821, 2003.
Since the Plaintiffs did not eliminate these other variables, or concretely
address them, then McDonalds Corporation is not legally responsible for Ms.
Pelman’s and Ms. Bradley’s obesity even if it is possible that the food may be
one of the contributing factors.
C.) GENERAL CAUSATION:
McDonald's food can be a general
cause of obesity and does present a threat to health however, only when over
consumed. Fast food—including McDonalds—frequently is lumped into unhealthy
categories of food. The previous court acknowledged that “it is well-known that
fast food in general, and McDonald's products in particular, contain high
levels of cholesterol, fat, salt and sugar, and that such attributes are bad
for one" Pelman v. Mcdonalds, 237 F.
Supp. 2d at 532, 2003. The national sensation Super Size Me highlighted the unhealthy nature of fast food and
specifically McDonalds. Also, the presence of unhealthy trans fats—especially
in fast food—became a national talking point in 2005 and brought the
detrimental aspects of junk food to light for the public.
However, a large distinction arises between the
general knowledge of all junk food and the specific products of each item at a
McDonald’s restaurant. Although the general public knows that fast food is junk
food, they do not know the nutritional contents of each specific item at a
McDonald’s store. The general public cannot be expected to make informed
choices based on the memorization of nutrition information they read on a web
page. This is due to the fact that there are too many products and too many
different restaurants, which cook their food based on the region, and that
every specific food item is not the same.
Despite the lack of common knowledge about
individual food subjects, the food products are still deleterious through over
consumption. According to the Respondent, “the fries themselves do not contain
cholesterol, though they may over an extended period of consumption contribute
to raised cholesterol levels within the body” Josh Alldredge, 2009. In fact, McDonald’s has only been proven to
affect health negatively over an extended period of time. If utilized
correctly, a choice that is up to the consumer, then according to the American
Dietary Association “all foods can fit into a healthy
diet and what's most important is eating a balanced diet over time” (McDonald’s
Corp.). In fact, through moderation, McDonald’s can be part of a healthy
lifestyle, the same way as caffeine and mayonnaise have become a staple in many
healthy Americans’ diets. Doctor Melissa Stevens—who is part of the
Preventative Cardiology at Cleveland Clinic’s Miller Family Heart and Vascular
Institute—points out that “McDonald’s can be part of a healthy diet if the
consumer informs his or herself about the nutritional value of the product and
stays smart about including variety in his or her diet” Josh Alldredge, 2009. McDonald's may be part of the cause, but its
liability cannot rest on consumers that will not eat in moderation. Instead, McDonald's
liability depends on a balance between McDonald’s honesty in providing
nutrition information and the consumers’ responsibility in making good
decisions in their dietary choices.
D.) MCDONALDS LIABILITY:
In cases such as
that before us, “liability is imposed only when the product has
an attribute not reasonably contemplated by the purchaser or is unreasonably
dangerous for its intended use" Huppe
v. Twenty-First Century Foods, 130 Misc.2d 736, 738, 497 N.Y.S.2d 306, 1985.
In Pelman et. al. v. McDonalds Corp—and
if the prior binding contract with the Attorney General of New York was carried
out—then neither of these tiers would be satisfied due to the fact that first, the unhealthy
aspects of McDonalds food would be well known and second, that McDonalds food
is not unreasonably dangerous for its intended use. However, as it stands now,
without the fulfillment of the prior binding contract with the Attorney General
of New York, then McDonalds does violate the first tier of consumer
contemplation due to the fact that the nutritional facts of each and every
specific McDonald’s food item is not common knowledge. Even though McDonalds
makes some effort to satisfy both of these tiers, they must still fulfill the
Agreement with the New York Attorney General in order to rid them of liability.
This section will address McDonald’s general liability, prior to the Attorney
General Agreement.
McDonald's is not liable when it provides the
necessary information and consumers are able to make a conscientious decision
about their eating choices. When free choice becomes an illusion “for instance,
by the masking of information necessary to make the choice, such as the
knowledge that eating McDonalds with a certain frequency would irrefragably
cause harm -- that [is when] manufacturers should be held accountable” Pelman v. McDonald's, 02 Civ. 7821, 2003.
In such a case, consumers would be unable to contemplate the dangerous effects
of the product. As the previous court stated, “consumers cannot be expected to
protect against a danger that was solely within McDonalds' knowledge. Thus, one
necessary element of any potentially viable claim must be that McDonalds'
products involve a danger that is not within the common knowledge of consumers”
Pelman v. McDonald's, 02 Civ. 7821, 2003.
However, since the dangerous effects of fast food can be contemplated, then the
knowledge is well within the over-consumers’ view and therefore McDonalds
cannot be held fully liable.
If anything, McDonald’s has worked to reduce the
potential for confusion. Under Federal legislation restaurants are not
restricted in the same way as pharmaceutical companies, which must disclose all
potential side effects of their product. Instead, “the full disclosure of the
nutritional information of a company’s product is dependent on the structure of
the business” (Meuth 2009, 4). Restaurants are protected from disclosure by the
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act in order to maintain proprietary recipes.
The Court has already ruled that Plaintiffs' claims
to the New York General Business Law were preempted by Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act (Small v Lorillard Tobacco Co. 1998, 1st
Dept). Small v Lorillard
parallels effectively with the current case. The Court’s ruling there
establishes that when New York Business Law regulations directly clash with
federal labeling regulations, the Court shall preference the federal
regulations. Absent proof that a product is foreseeably dangerous, McDonald’s
does not have an a priori responsibility
per relevant legislation to provide nutritional information. Even so,
McDonald’s has disclosed all nutrition facts online, having targeted the
internet as the most effective means of mass communication. “McDonald’s has
gone above and beyond its duty as a food producer” (Meuth 2009, 5).But at a
minimum, McDonald’s is not independently liable for failure to provide
nutritional information.
One could argue that even though the nutritional
information is provided, it is not easily accessible for the consumer. The
three clicks are not easy to follow and this Court cannot expect consumers to
have specific knowledge about the products or to have access to Internet at the
time of purchase. This argument would only apply if the Appellant was able to
demonstrate harms incurred directly because of inability to access specific
nutritional information. We do not feel that the Appellant has succeeded in
establishing this proof. Furthermore, we feel that whether McDonald’s
nutritional information is sufficient is determined by the degree of
responsibility incurred by the specific habits of the consumer. In this case,
the Plaintiffs’ high rate of consumption means that deficiencies in McDonald’s
nutritional disclosure are irrelevant in the face of the Plaintiff’s high
consumer responsibility.
E.) CONSUMER RESPONSIBILITY:
The responsibility of consumers,
when it comes to product consumption, is to educate themselves. In this case,
that would require the parents of Jazlen Bradley and Ashley Pelman to
understand what they are feeding their kids, and to recognize that fast food in
general should not be a daily meal. The majority for this Court agrees that
“anyone who consumes any product three to five times a week, or even more, a
large degree of personal responsibility must be shown for understanding one’s
own consumption.,” Josh Alldredge, 2009.
Although the specifics of each McDonald’s product were not known, the general
causation of fast food as a whole and as unhealthy was a known aspect that
should weigh on the consumers’ responsibilities.
In conjunction with McDonald’s duty as a
restaurant, a majority of the responsibility also lies with the consumer to
self educate. In a case of such over consumption, McDonald's provides the
information necessary for consumers to make a conscientious decision about such
a large aspect of their lives. Although individual nutritional information
packets were not provided, the consumers should understand the impact that fast
food in general will have on their overall health. McDonald’s liability is also
not present because “if consumers know (or reasonably should know) the
potential ill health effects of eating at McDonald’s [or any fast food], they
cannot blame McDonald’s if they, nonetheless, choose to satiate their appetite
with a surfeit of supersized McDonald’s products” Pelman v. McDonald's, 02 Civ. 7821, 2003. The Plaintiffs failed to
show that they were unaware of the unhealthy aspects of all fast food and have
therefore failed to demonstrate that their decision to eat mainly fast food was
their responsibility and not McDonald’s responsibility.
Ultimately, the liability lies on the consumer
and in the case of unhealthy food the consumer must demonstrate caution and
moderation. In fact, “there is no allegation that McDonalds of New York has
produced or distributed a product that is so dangerous that its danger is
outside the reasonable understanding of a consumer” Pelman v. McDonald's, 02 Civ. 7821, 2003. This means that with a
little effort, the Plaintiffs could have fully educated themselves about the health
detriments of fast food in general. Instead, even though McDonald’s food made
up 1/7 of their diet, the Plaintiffs failed to take the responsibility for
self-educating themselves about their general intake as a whole.
F.)
McDonald’s advertising is not deceptive:
The District Court dismissed the
Plaintiff’s original claims on the basis that the Plaintiffs did not articulate
specific examples of deceptive advertisements in their original brief, and
instead “rely on facts outside the pleading” (Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 2003
U.S. Dist. S.D.N.Y., 2003).
The Court extended to the Plaintiff the opportunity to provide specific
examples in their appeal brief, (on the basis of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56).
As the Court in Fonte v. Board of
Managers of Continental Towers Condominiums ruled in a similar case, we
“will not consider statements outside the pleadings in reaching its holding.”
Consequently this decision can only respond to the explicit citations included
in the Appellant brief.
The plaintiffs center their
deception claims on sections 349 and 350 of the New York General Business Law.
However, the New York General Business Law does not assert that the absence of
negative details in an advertisement necessarily constitutes deceptive
advertising. The Court reinforced this interpretation when it ruled on the New
York General Business Law in 1998, declaring that the “plaintiffs'
allegations of misrepresentation did not furnish sufficient examples of
misrepresentations on which they relied necessary to support [a] prima facie
case that defendants defrauded plaintiffs by means of affirmative
misrepresentations” (Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co. 1998, 1st Dept).
As such, a positive focus in an advertisement is insufficient to prove
misrepresentation. Instead a deceptive advertisement must directly misinform
its audience about a specific aspect of a product. The appellant cites a
McDonald’s advertisement that claimed “We toss a fresh mix of gourmet greens in
the kitchen each and every day.” The appellant then reveals that McDonald’s
salads include “MSG, various sugars, and trans-fatty acids (in the form of
several partially hydrogenated oils” (Wheeler 2009, 5). However, these facts do
not directly interact: the first does not mischaracterize the second. The
quality of the lettuce has no bearing on the other ingredients that are used to
create the final salad product. Moreover, the Appellant does not imply any flaw
in the depiction of the lettuce. It is true that McDonald’s chooses to
highlight a positive ingredient rather than ingredients with negative
connotations. Nevertheless, this advertising technique is consistent with the
New York General Business Law.
Furthermore, the advertisements
under scrutiny are not deceptive from a practical perspective. Under the New
York General Business Law, the only law that the McDonald’s advertisements have
allegedly violated, “the standard for whether an act
or practice is misleading is objective, requiring a showing that a reasonable
consumer would have been misled” (Oswego
Laborer’s Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 85 N.Y.2d 1995).
The idea that a reasonable consumer would not understand that a salad consists
of more than just lettuce, no matter how fresh, is clearly erroneous. The appellants
characterization of the slogan “cholesterol free fries” as deceptive is
similarly flawed (Wheeler 2009, 5). As far as we can tell, this slogan was in
good part designed in response to the well publicized Sharma v. McDonald’s
case, in which Hindu vegetarians sued McDonald’s for failure to disclose that
its french-fries were prepared in a beef extract, causing them to have high
quantities of cholesterol. The slogan in question functions as a means of
distinguishing McDonald’s new fries from pre-lawsuit fries that had contained
cholesterol.
Moreover, ruling that the “cholesterol free
fries” characterization is deceptive would set an egregious precedent. There
are myriad fat free products on the market, the consumption of which can
inevitably be indirectly linked to an increase in body fat for the regular
consumer. Fat free ice cream provides an obvious example. Ruling for the
appellant would force a multitude of changes in product labeling across the
consumer food item industry that is well beyond this court’s role. But more
importantly, this demonstrates that the “reasonable consumer” would not be
deceived by this advertising method. Instead, the reasonable consumer
understands that, in the context of an advertisement, the term free does not
eliminate potential indirect linkages, especially in cases of high consumption.
Again, we feel that close examination of the specific examples cited by the
Appellant demonstrates that McDonald’s advertisements are not deceptive within
the New York General Business Law.
G.) McDonald’s is in violation of a binding legal agreemenT:
Claims upon general legal statutes become
irrelevant however, when McDonald’s has waived broad legal recourse in signing
a specific and binding legal agreement with the New York Attorney General. In
1987, the Attorney general completed a full investigation of McDonald’s
advertisements. He opined that McDonald’s had violated state consumer
protection statutes and declared
that McDonald's advertisements were deceptive (Pelman v. McDonald's. 07 Civ.
05710). The Attorney General further demanded that McDonald’s comply with four
remedial steps; (1) to provide customers with nutritional information on all
their products, at all their stores, (2) to disclose all ingredients as well as
FDA required food additives and dyes, (3) to provide the information in easily
understood pamphlets or brochures which will be free to all customers so they
could take them with them for further study, and (4) to place signs, including
in-store advertising to inform customers who walk in, and drive through
information and notices would be placed where drive-through customers could see
them (Wheeler 2009, 6). In 1986, the Attorney General sent a letter to
McDonald’s counsel, outlining these steps and threatened a lawsuit if
McDonald’s did not sign an agreement to comply (Van De Kamp 1986). Obviously
McDonald’s could have challenged the Attorney General, based on the findings
presented in Section A of this decision. However, as soon as McDonald’s signed
the agreement proposed by the Attorney General, the company became legally
bound to observe all the requirements therein.
The Attorney General acted fully within the
limits of his office in his interaction with McDonald’s. In Lefkowitz v Fey the Court ruled that
Provisions of the
Executive Law and the General Business Law authorizing the Attorney General to
apply for an order enjoining allegedly fraudulent, illegal and deceptive
practices and acts in the marketing and sale of certain products is not
unconstitutional as being ambiguous, as failing to define proscribed conduct in
language that is able to be understood, nor as amounting to an unauthorized
delegation of legislative authority (Lefkowitz v Fey
1976). (sic)
This
ruling upheld the constitutionality of sections within the New York General
Business Law that specifically enable the Attorney General to act as he did
when addressing McDonald’s. In fact, the ruling dismissed three distinct
challenges to the power of the Attorney General. The actions of the Attorney
General were not only established in state legislation, but have been upheld
and maintained in Lefkowitz v Frey.
Consequently, McDonald’s is legally bound to
institute the changes outlined in the Attorney General’s letter. Yet McDonald’s
vice president of marketing has admitted that “no advertisements (with the
exception of the "milkshake advertisement") were ever removed or
terminated although requested by the Attorney General” (Wheeler 2009, 6). More
specifically, McDonald’s has failed to introduce the brochure system or
in-store advertising in the majority of its New York franchises (Wheeler 2009,
3). This places McDonald’s in definitive violation of a binding legal concord.
H.)
Conclusion:
This court rules that McDonald’s advertisements were
not deceptive, as claimed by the Appellant. This ruling is based on the
specific examples cited by the defendant, as well as the precedent that the New
York courts have set regarding the New York Business Law. Moreover, McDonald’s
advertisements are not deceptive from a practical perspective. Finally, the
federal Nutrition Labeling and Education Act underlines that, as a general
rule, restaurants are not responsible for providing nutritional disclosure.
However, McDonald’s entered into prior, binding contract with the Attorney
General of New York, which holds McDonald’s to a higher legal standard within
the state of New York. It is this specific legal standard that McDonald’s has
violated. This court affirms the right of the Attorney General to bring a complaint
against McDonald’s in the appropriate court of law.
Chief Justice Hanson dissenting in part.
I
agree with the majority’s opinion concerning Section B that Pelman has failed
to prove McDonald’s caused her specific health problems; Section C that
McDonald’s foods are generally unhealthful and dangerous when consumed in
consistent doses; Section F that McDonald’s advertising is not deceptive
(though it is misleading); and Section G that McDonald’s specifically is
required to provide nutritional information as part of its binding legal
agreement with the Attorney General.
I
take issue with the majority’s reading of McDonald’s responsibility in what it
concedes is their selling of a dangerous product. It is true that federal as
well as general New York law does not require nutrition labeling in
restaurants. But that does not absolve McDonald’s nor other restaurants from
legal responsibility for providing such information to consumers. Instead, it
means that general rules governing liability apply.
As such, initially, McDonald’s product is
dangerous. The majority concedes this point. But the majority claims that
McDonald’s product is dangerous only if consumed in “excess.” What excess
obviously is going to be subject to interpretation but it is clear that McDonald’s
knows that its product will be consumed excessively. As Joe Wheeler’s brief
noted:
The Plaintiff, Ashley Pelman, has purchased McDonald’s
products, mostly Happy Meals and Big Macs, on average of three to four times
per week from the ages of five through twelve (Pelman v. McDonald's. 07 Civ.
05710). This would classify her as a
"Heavy User," a term used by McDonald's Corporation (Pelman v.
McDonald's. 07 Civ. 05710). The Plaintiff, Jazlyn Bradley, has purchased and/or
consumed McDonald’s foods for her entire life during school lunch breaks and
before and after school, approximately five times a week, ordering two meals
per day (mostly the Big Mac Meal, Chicken McNugget Meal or Fish Meal
sandwiches) (Pelman v. McDonald's. 07 Civ. 05710). This would classify her as a "Super Heavy User," another term
used by McDonald's Corporation (Pelman v. McDonald's. 07 Civ. 05710).
McDonald’s Vice-President of Marketing
for the United States, David Green, has testified in prior proceedings that the
Defendant specifically targets “Heavy Users” and “Super Heavy Users” in their
advertising campaigns in an effort to increase the frequencies of purchases at
their stores and consumption of their products (Pelman v. McDonald's. 07
Civ. 05710). McDonald’s present
marketing goal for “Heavy Users” is approximately twenty times per month for
every fast food user (Pelman v. McDonald's. 07 Civ. 05710).
It
is clear that McDonald’s not only is aware that its customers are consuming its
product at what the majority calls “excessive” levels, it is encouraging them
to eat even more.
Even under the majority’s crimped
reading of product liability, McDonald’s is at fault. The majority notes that:
“In cases such as that before us, “liability is imposed only when the product
has an attribute not reasonably contemplated by the purchaser or is
unreasonably dangerous for its intended use" Huppe v. Twenty-First Century
Foods, 130 Misc.2d 736, 738, 497 N.Y.S.2d 306, 1985. It is imminently obvious
that McDonald’s product is unreasonably dangerous for one of its intended uses,
that of the heavy and super heavy user.
But it is not just McDonald’s
realization of the dangers of its product, tort law specifically makes
McDonald’s liable. As Section 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability, states: A product:
(a)
contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended
design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and
marketing of the product;
(b) is
defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product
could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative
design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial
chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe;
(c)
is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller
or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution,
and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not
reasonably safe.
McDonald’s
is legally obligated to provide information to its customers of its danger to
health. The Attorney General’s agreement is a solid step in the right direction
but also would require notice that excessive consumption of aspects of its
products is harmful (saturated fats, simple carbs, sugar, etc.).
The majority claims that a web page
with nutritional information is sufficient. It is not. The web site is
difficult to traverse and nutrition information on the page, while three clicks
in, is extremely difficult to find. Further, as you search, repeated messages
about how healthy McDonald’s food pops up. While this lack of information on
McDonald’s part is sufficient for us to declare that their advertising is not
deceptive, it is not sufficient for
warning consumers of the dangers of eating some of their foods. They have a
legal obligation to provide clear nutritional information at the point of
purchase.
And, while it is probably true that
your average person knows generally that McDonald’s foods are potentially
unhealthy, it does not mean that everyone knows that. And, further, it
does not mean consumers know a sufficient level of detail needed to make truly
wise eating decisions. Ask yourself now: Which has more saturated fats: a
McDonald’s burger or a Premium Southwest Salad with Crispy Chicken? What has
more carbs: a small fries or a double cheeseburger? Do you really know the
answers? If you sought to memorize the relevant information from McDonald’s web
page, you’d be looking at something that is 18 pages in length. Go ahead, try
it at http://www.mcdonalds.com/
Now, couple the many bits of information for
just McDonald’s with all the other restaurants you wish to eat at, and you have
consumers unable to, as the majority requests, “to take the responsibility for self-educating
themselves about their general intake as a whole.” (op cite) And when that food
is as dangerous as the majority concedes, the lack of information is not
permitted under the law as I understand it.
As
such, I respectfully dissent.