FLORIDA v

FLORIDA v. GRAHAM

DISPOSITION: Reversed.

JUDGES: Authored by Josh Meuth Alldredge and Jake Cappel with whom Chief Justice Hanson joins.

In the Matter of the Criminal Punishment Code of: STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent, v. TERRANCE JAMAR GRAHAM, Appellant.

HANSON SUPREME COURT

October 30, 2009, Filed

PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from The District Court of Appeal, First District, State of Florida Docket No. 1D06-3190. Date Filed: 04/10/2008.

COUNSEL: For Appellant: Molly Warner, Walla Walla, WA.

For Respondent: Aviv Bridge, Walla Walla, WA.

Facts of the Case

In December of 2003 Terrance Graham, the appellant, plead guilty to attempted robbery and was sentenced to three years of probation. At the age of 17, Graham's probation officer filed an affidavit alleging that Graham had violated his probation four days earlier. The officer alleged that Graham had possession of a firearm, that he violated the law, committed home invasion robbery, fled, and attempted to elude a law enforcement officer. Under the Criminal Punishment Code score sheet, 60 months was the lowest sentence that Graham could receive, and life imprisonment without parole was the maximum sentence. The Court sentenced Graham to life in prison without parole, rejecting recommendations for lesser sentences from the state, Graham's Counsel, and the Department of Corrections.

MAJORITY OPINION

I. VIOLATION OF THE 8^TH AMENDMENT

The Florida First District Court’s ruling violates the 8^th Amendment. Graham’s “potential to achieve a mature understanding of his own humanity” was not allowed by the disproportionate sentencing of the Florida court, which is not permissible under the 8^th Amendment. Graham’s sentence of life without parole exceeded even the prosecutor’s recommended sentence and, considering the fact that the defendant never actually harmed anybody physically, was overzealous and unreasonable.

The primary question in this case is whether or not the sentence of life without parole constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. To evaluate this, we must look to the 8^th Amendment: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”[1] After lengthy consideration, we are convinced that the sentence of Graham (for non-homicide, non-battery charges) was excessive, disproportionate, cruel, and unusual.

a. PROPORTIONALITY & UNUSUALNESS

The Respondent is correct in arguing that the court had the ability to weigh the principles of the Criminal Punishment Code of Florida (see appendix A). However, the degree to which the Florida court disregarded principles (c) and (i) and favored principles (b) and (g) was unacceptable. Principle (c) reads: “The penalty imposed is commensurate with the severity of the primary offense and the circumstances surrounding the primary offense.” To add context to this clause, we must look to the fact that juveniles charged with murder under this punishment code would get life without parole, the exact same sentence that Graham has received. This means that his sentence is the absolute maximum that could have been given, while his crime was far from the maximum violence that can be executed in a crime. Additionally, (i) emphasizes the necessity of prioritizing incarcerative sanctions toward offenders with long prior records and those convicted of “serious” crimes, which when considering life without parole should be ones in which someone is physically injured. Also, principle (e) states that “The severity of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender’s prior record”, supporting the idea that the extreme severity of the sentence (LWOP) is unlawful given the short and non-homicidal record of the juvenile. [2] The respondent claimed, “the potential for a loss of life is high.”[3] Although this may be true, the court should not judge Mr. Graham for actions that he did not commit or scenarios that had potential for happening. The previous court clearly used speculative measures to rationalize the severity of its punishment and as a result weighed principle (i) too heavily. A consideration of the nature of Graham’s crimes (in which he never actually injured anyone physically) in combination with the aforementioned principles, indicates an erroneous judgment on the part of the previous court: disproportionate sentencing.

The Respondent argues that the life without parole sentence does not violate the 8^th Amendment because Graham’s sentence is not unusual for the crimes he has committed. This is a meritless claim. While many states may allow heavy juvenile sentencing, few actually utilize it on any frequent basis. No juvenile is currently serving life without parole outside of Florida for a burglary or robbery offense. Of those 106 convicted youngsters who are serving LWOP, 72% of them are in Florida alone. Additionally, the juveniles serving life sentences outside of the state are were imprisoned for more serious convictions, such as sexual battery and other violent crimes.[4] With thousands and thousands of juvenile sentences handed out every year in the United States, life without parole is indeed an unusual occurrence for physically non-violent crimes.

Clearly, Floridian juvenile convicts are receiving unusual and extremely heavy sentencing and punishment. Graham, who never caused physical damage to another human, is one of the most unfortunate recipients of excessive and disproportionate Florida punishment. In Solem v. Helm, “the Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel punishments prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.” Solem v. Helm also noted that, “there is no basis for the state’s assertion that the principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison sentences. Neither the text of the 8^th Amendment nor the history behind it supports such an exception. Moreover, this Court’s cases have recognized explicitly that prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis.” [5] In Solem v. Helm the Supreme Court established a set of standards for proportionality analysis with clear criteria. The set of standards include the gravity of the offense and harshness of the penalty, comparison to other sentences in the same jurisdiction, comparison to other jurisdictions, and harm caused or threat to society.[6] The previous court incorrectly applied this set of standards and as a result misjudged the proportionality of Mr. Graham’s sentence in comparison to the crime he committed. The lower court did compare this case to other sentences in the same jurisdiction when it compared it to Blackshear v. Florida but failed to compare the case to other jurisdictions. As we have noted, this sentence diverges from the standards set in other jurisdictions by most other juvenile sentencing.

Clearly, the proportion of the length of the sentence to the nature of the crime committed is a critical consideration in the evaluation of a punishment’s adherence to or violation of the 8^th Amendment. But we must examine the rationale for the use of 8^th Amendment’s requirement for proportional punishment and requirement against cruel and unusual punishment. What principles can best clarify the application of the cruel and unusual clause to court sentences and punishments?

In Furman v. Georgia (1972), Justice Brennan outlined 4 principles for determining if a specific punishment is cruel and unusual.

The "essential predicate" is "that a punishment must not by its severity be degrading to human dignity," especially torture.
"A severe punishment that is obviously inflicted in wholly arbitrary fashion."
"A severe punishment that is clearly and totally rejected throughout society."
"A severe punishment that is patently unnecessary."[7]

Because the sentence issued by the Florida First District Court was much larger than the respective recommendations of the prosecution, the Department of Corrections, and the Defendant’s counsel, we note that the punishment was inflicted in an “arbitrary fashion.” In addition to meeting the second of Brennan’s principles, the Florida LWOP sentence fits into the fourth principle as well. As we will discuss in the following arguments, the sentence was cruel. But on a more pragmatic level, it was also “patently unnecessary,” and thus disproportionate to the crime committed. The sentence was unnecessary because it is the maximum sentence possible for a juvenile being utilized to punish a minimal offense that did not involve physical harm. At some point in the future, it is quite possible that Graham will be a different person and his release may be quite justified. The severity of this sentence prevents such reasonable action and as a result is unnecessary, indeed harmful. This fact makes it clear that the Florida First District Court has sentenced Graham in a disproportionate manner, which is prohibited by the 8^th Amendment.

b. CRUELTY

Not only is life without parole sentencing of offenders who have not used physical violence cruel, but such sentences are especially cruel in the case of juvenile non-violent offenders. The cruelty of the sentence issued by the Florida First District Court is quite plain on both of those levels. A young man who has known a very short free life has been caged for the greater part of his existence without chance or hope of reintegration into society. As a child and adolescent, he has been offered a very poor introduction to the potential that life holds. Mr. Graham has not had a comfortable upbringing. As the appellant pointed out “Social factors are necessarily important to the reasons for delinquency in adolescents.”[8] Therefore, it is reasonable to consider social factors when deciding someone’s sentence , particularly one as extreme as in this case. Mr. Graham had little to no support from both his family and his peers. He was especially susceptible to peer pressure given the lack of stability at home. As the appellant pointed out, both Mr. Graham’s parents broke the law repeatedly, smoked crack, and moved Graham further from the possibility of creating an honest, real life for himself. Additionally, Mr. Graham’s siblings had numerous troubles with the law. Mr. Graham was raised in an environment that encouraged delinquent behavior and because of his age and early developmental stage, Mr. Graham was especially susceptible to influences from his family and peers. Mr. Graham’s social environment certainly contributed to the crimes he committed. Although it does not excuse Mr. Grahams actions in any way it should still be taken into consideration when applying the correct form of punishment. In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court noted that not even “expert psychologists [can] differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”[9] It is clear that the previous court did not take this information into account and as a result weighed principle (b) of the Florida Punishment Code too strongly, which states that punishment is the primary purpose of a sentence but rehabilitation is a desired goal. The court's decision to sentence Mr. Graham to life in prison without any possibility of parole is cruel because it is not only disproportionate to the crime committed but it also does not take into account the context of Mr. Graham’s background and his youth.

To lock him up for the remainder of his existence is to rob him of his life and all the opportunities he will have to find self-determination and contribute to our society. As acknowledged by the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons makes it clear that the state does not have the authority to extinguish the life of a juvenile or eliminate their “potential to achieve a mature understanding of their own humanity.”[10] Though Roper considered the juvenile death penalty specifically, a young man who is forever removed from society in life without parole while still a minor is clearly disabled from realizing a “mature understanding of his own humanity” (Bridge 2009). An inability to contribute to society as well as an impediment to understanding his own humanity will be precisely the damages that will be done to Graham absent a finding that these sentences are unconstitutional.

As we have noted, the sentencing of physically non-violent offenders to life without parole is unconstitutional. But the sentence that the Florida court gave Graham was an especially egregious error because of his youth.

Terrance Graham’s first and second convictions both occurred when Terrance was not yet 18 years of age. As Judge Cappel points out, he was stuck in a context of drugs and violence, and calling his family unsupportive would be a massive understatement. His world had few positive outlets, especially to someone his age. Opportunities for self-betterment were few and far between, and it would be fair to say that Graham must have had a hard time envisioning his life’s positive potential given his situation. Most importantly, his young age may have prevented him from fully comprehending the consequences of his actions and the severity of his crimes. Additionally, Graham was suffering from the debilitating mental illnesses of depression and Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (ADHD), an incapacitating syndrome that prevents efficient attention to details and competent use of reason in stressful situations.[11] As discussed by the Appellant, adolescents’ brains are “anatomically undeveloped in parts of the cerebrum associated with impulse control regulation of emotions, risk assessment and moral reasoning.”[12]

In fact, according to the National Institute of Mental Health, a division of the NIH, remarkable chemical differences exist between the adolescent frontal cortex and the adult frontal cortex, which “relates to the maturation of cognitive processing and other ‘executive’ functions.” Further, NIMH notes that MRI scanning has proven that children and adolescents cannot process information in a reasoned manner when confronted with powerful emotional stimuli, such as fear, anger or intimidation.[13] To charge Graham as an adult may have been permissible, but given this information and the additional evidence provided by the Appellant, it was certainly not advisable. Given the immature, undeveloped nature of the Appellant, charging him as an adult and delivering a life without parole sentence is overstepping the law.

CONCLUSION

A sentence of life imprisonment without parole is unconstitutional in the case of Mr. Graham. Further, a sentence of imprisonment for life without parole is unconstitutional for any crimes that do not cause any physical harm to anyone. Mr. Graham’s case illustrates how crimes that do not harm anyone must be distinguished from more heinous crimes in our society. A life sentence without parole is one of the most extreme forms of punishment in this country and should therefore be reserved for the most serious offenses in order to meet the proportionality requirements and not pose any threat to the 8^th Amendment. Crimes that are justifiably punishable by life in prison without parole would be ones such as felonious acts of violence that involve the actual use of violence (and not just the threat of violence) such as rape, murder, and serious assault offenses. Although the threat of violence should not be taken lightly, a distinction between a threat of violence and an act of violence is an important one. An act of violence that is physically harmful is undoubtedly more serious than an act of violence that involves a threat and should be treated as such in order to uphold the integrity of the 8^th Amendment.

By wrongly applying the standards for punishment, the Florida court punished Mr. Graham the exact same way they would punish someone who had committed murder or rape, demonstrating that Mr. Graham's punishment is excessive. Although the previous court claimed to use the standards set out by the Supreme Court in Solem v. Helm, it is apparent that they were misinterpreted and incorrectly applied to Mr. Graham’s case. This case is to be remanded to the Florida First District Court of Appeal for a decision that is consistent with this decision.

APPENDIX (A)

Florida Statute: Criminal Punishment Code (921.002 (1) (2003))

(a) Sentencing is neutral with respect to race, gender, and social and economic status.

(b) The primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender. Rehabilitation is a desired goal of the criminal justice system but is subordinate to the goal of punishment.

(c) The penalty imposed is commensurate with the severity of the primary offense and the circumstances surrounding the primary offense.

(d) The severity of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender's prior record.

(e) The sentence imposed by the sentencing judge reflects the length of actual time to be served, shortened only by the application of incentive and meritorious gain-time as provided by law, and may not be shortened if the defendant would consequently serve less than 85 percent of his or her term of imprisonment as provided in s. 944.275(4)(b)3. The provisions of chapter 947, relating to parole, shall not apply to persons sentenced under the Criminal Punishment Code.

(f) Departures below the lowest permissible sentence established by the code must be articulated in writing by the trial court judge and made only when circumstances or factors reasonably justify the mitigation of the sentence. The level of proof necessary to establish facts that support a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is a preponderance of the evidence.

(g) The trial court judge may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense, including an offense that is before the court due to a violation of probation or community control.

(h) A sentence may be appealed on the basis that it departs from the Criminal Punishment Code only if the sentence is below the lowest permissible sentence or as enumerated in s. 924.06(1).

(i) Use of incarcerative sanctions is prioritized toward offenders convicted of serious offenses and certain offenders who have long prior records, in order to maximize the finite capacities of state and local correctional facilities.[14]

[1] The Eighth Amendment, the Bill of Rights, the United States Constitution. Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eighth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution on 10/22/09

[2] Florida Statute 921.002 (1)(2003). Accessed at < http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0921/Sec002.HTM> on 10/20/09.

[8] Huitt, W. and Hummel, J. Cognitive Development. January 1998. Accessed 9/27/09. <http://chiron.valdosta.edu/whuitt/col/cogsys/piaget.html>.

[13] National Institutes of Health: National Institute of Mental Health. Teenage Brain: A Work in Progress (Factsheet) Retrieved 10/20/09 at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/teenage-brain-a-work-in-progress-fact-sheet/index.shtml

[14] Florida Statute 921.002 (1)(2003). Accessed at < http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0921/Sec002.HTM> on 10/20/09.