In the Matter of the Execution of CHRISTOPHER SIMMONS, Respondent, v. DONALD P. ROPER,
March 10, 2006, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from Supreme
Court of
DISPOSITION: Affirmed
COUNSEL:
For Appellant: Mathew Kelly,
For Respondent: None!
JUDGES: Authored by Sam Booch and
Nathaniel Jacob
Dissenting, Justice Jim Hanson
FACTS OF THE CASE
Christopher Simmons, 17, was found guilty of murdering Shirley Crooke, having
bound and gagged her before dumping her into the
I. Introduction
The pertinent question presented by this case is whether the use of capital punishment by the state upon persons under the age of 18 qualifies under the Eighth amendment as “cruel and unusual” and may therefore be deemed unconstitutional. In Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. (1989) this Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the death penalty from being used on individuals who are the age of 16 or 17 who commit the crime of murder, and has upheld that decision several times since (see Mullin v. Hain, 538 U.S. (2003); In re Stanford, 537 U.S. (2002); Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. (2002)). This court reaffirms the Stanford decision, finding that capital punishment of those aged 16 and 17 is constitutional and does not constitute “cruel and unusual punishment.”
II. ‘Cruel’
The
question of cruelty is an inherently difficult one to answer, as the term is
sufficiently vague. Nearly any punishment endorsed by the justice system,
everything from imprisonment to execution, might be seen as cruel by someone.
The definition of cruelty in the Merriam-Webster dictionary is “causing or
conducive to injury, grief, or pain,” which does little to differentiate the
death penalty from any other punishment a court might hand down in punishment
for murder. Finding any punishment as cruel under the Eighth amendment seems to
rely upon a judgment based on subjective emotion rather than legal precedent,
which presents the uncomfortable situation of this court being forced to apply
its own feelings on the issue as law.
At the time of the Stanford case, 25 of 37 states that allowed the death penalty had enacted legislation that permitted the execution of minors in some fashion, establishing clear public consensus in favor of the use of the death penalty on juvenile murderers. The 13 states that do not permit the death penalty have the right to refuse the use of that punishment within their state borders, but this court does not believe it is appropriate for their feelings on the death penalty to influence the manner in which those that do allow capital punishment practice it. For this reason, the question of majority sentiment will be answered by examining the number of death penalty states that allow the execution of juveniles in comparison with the number of death penalty states that prohibit such execution of juveniles. At this time, 20 of 37 death penalty states still have active legislation that allows the execution of juveniles. Although five states saw fit to amend their policy towards the execution of minors, a clear majority of death penalty states still endorse the execution of juveniles in certain circumstances, sufficient to show this court that there exists no public sentiment against the execution of juveniles among the majority of the American population that reside within states that support the death penalty that would influence the sentiment of this court.
When determining whether a punishment qualifies as cruel, the main criterion that comes to mind is whether the punishment fits the crime. In the instance of a heinous, pointless, premeditated murder in the first degree by an individual who shows little or no remorse, and who goes so far as to brag about his crime to others, the taking of that person’s life by the state seems appropriate. The fact that the offender in question is 17 instead of 18 seems to matter little in the context of the crime, and does not mitigate the menace the criminal presents to society, nor the knowing nature of his crime. The death penalty is in place to punish crimes of exactly this nature, and this court does not see it as cruel to allow it to do so when a judge and jury have found it appropriate in a state whose constitution allows the handing down of such a punishment.
III. ‘Unusual’
In order to determine the framers’ intent for the word unusual in the Eighth
amendment, this court defers to the Lynch court’s method of determination: the California
Supreme court in re Lynch (1972), 8
C3d, identified three techniques courts used to determine whether the
punishment in question is limited by the Eighth amendment. First, they examined
the nature of the offense and the offender (425). Second, they compared the
punishment with the penalty for more serious crimes in the same jurisdiction
(426). Third, they compared the punishment to the penalty for the same offense
in different jurisdictions (427). Using
these three techniques the court was able to make interpretive judgments based
on other courts’ notions of unusual punishment.
The nature of the offense in this case is the brutal murder by drowning
of the victim Shirley Cook by the defendant Christopher Simmons; a clear-cut
case of murder one and a capital offense commonly punishable by death. It is
clear to this court that Simmons’ offense is among the worst imaginable, and it
would not seem unusual for the state to employ the most extreme measures for
punishment at its disposal.
It is difficult to apply the second technique of determination, as few
crimes committed by inmates currently on death row in Missouri may be clearly
defined as more serious than murder in the first degree. However, the death penalty has been carried
out 103 times since 1930 as punishment for murders similar in degree to that
committed by Simmons, and this figure conveys the same
significance as punishments for more serious crimes would. Under the second technique of determination,
the punishment is therefore not unusual.
Finally, when compared to similar cases in other jurisdictions under the
third criterion, this court finds again that the use of the death penalty as
punishment for murder committed in the first degree is not uncommon in any of
the other 37 states that endorse the death penalty. As the petitioner pointed
out in his brief, 123 minors have been sentenced to death for the offense of
murder in the years 1993-2003 in at least thirteen different states, enough to
show this court that the execution of juveniles is not in fact unusual when
held to the third criteria of the Lynch court.
It is this Court’s determination that the execution of Christopher
Simmons is not restricted by the word ‘unusual’ in the Eighth amendment because
applying the death penalty to this case is no more unusual than it would be
when applied to any other death row case.
IV. Cruel ‘and’ Unusual
Key
to this question is the power of the word “and” in “cruel and unusual
punishments.” In the context of the Eight amendment, “and” indicates that both
connected terms must be present while “or” would suggest that merely one of the
two would be sufficient. This difference between “and” and “or” is neither
translucent nor difficult to grasp, and relies solely upon everyday evident
usage of these words; it is reasonable to believe that the framers of the
Eighth amendment intentionally chose the word they did (“and”). This difference
is significant to the court, as it clearly indicates to this court that the
framers of the Eighth amendment did not intend all cruel punishments to be prohibited (for indeed, all punishment
might be seen as “cruel” in some fashion), nor that all unusual punishments be prohibited (for that would preclude
progressive methods of criminal punishment from evolving, as new methods will
always be “unusual” when compared to what came before).
In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. (1991) the
court ruled that ''severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they
are not unusual in the constitutional sense, having been employed in various
forms throughout our Nation's history,” establishing a precedent for cruel
punishments to be allowed so long as they are not also unusual. This court
under the Eighth amendment shall only prohibit those punishments that qualify
both as cruel and as unusual. If
cruelty or unusualness were intended to be sufficient cause for the
prohibition of a punishment, the framers would have written the amendment with
that language. Only if the state execution of convicted murderers under the age
of 18 were to be shown as both cruel
and unusual could this court uphold the Supreme Court of Missouri’s
decision. As neither cruelty nor unusualness
has been shown, this court strikes finds the execution of Christopher Simmons
does not qualify as “cruel and unusual.”
V. Evolving Standards
In
the past, the use of the death penalty on juveniles 16 or 17 years of age has
been upheld as constitutional. Evolving standards could, however, justify the
prohibition of juvenile execution by rendering such punishment morally
inappropriate if not unconstitutional. Our standards could have evolved in such
a manner as to make life in general more sacred than before in the hearts of
Americans. In that case the death penalty could be found no longer to be an
acceptable punishment for the crime of murder, and the death penalty could be
prohibited in all instances (not just those involving juveniles). However, the
death penalty continues to be handed down by a significant number of juries
every year in the 37 states that allow capital punishment, enough to show that
while there will always be controversy surrounding the issue it nonetheless
remains a viable and socially permissible method of punishment for convicted
murderers. From 2000-2005 there have
been 406 executions in the
Alternatively,
if our standards have evolved in such a manner as to cause us to view 16 and 17
year olds as less capable of mature premeditated action than we formerly held,
more like innocent children than autonomous adults 18 years of age and older,
then it could become cruel for us to subject them to the same punishments as
adults. The fact that five states have amended their policy towards the death
penalty to prohibit the execution of juveniles since the Stanford case does not go unnoticed by this court; that is indeed evidence
of an evolving standard in those states. However, the changing opinion of five
states does not present proof of an overwhelming evolution of national
standards; 20 out of 37 death penalty states continue to find it appropriate to
reserve the right to apply capital punishment to juveniles. While there is
reason to believe that standards have evolved in
Common experience suggests that there is no significant difference between the maturity level of a 16, 17, and 18 year old; chronological age is not an unfailing measure of psychological development, and many 17-year-olds seem more mature than the average young 'adult'. Unfortunately, one can see juveniles committing crimes of increasing ferocity with every appearance of premeditation and knowing action. In 2002, 12% of all individuals arrested for violent crime were juveniles. Cases such as that of 16 year old Scott Dyleski who stabbed and bludgeoned Pamela Vitale to death after breaking into her home, 17 year old John Lee Malvo who participated in a three-week killing spree that left 10 dead in Virginia, and many other teen murderers whose names remain closed to the public despite their horrific actions all show the reality of the capacity of juveniles to commit murders as grievous as any done by adults. If juveniles are going to act like adults, and commit crimes worthy of the most hardened adult criminals, then common sense holds that it is appropriate to punish them as adults, as the jury found in the trial of Christopher Simmons. As mentioned by the petitioner in his brief, a survey in 1995 showed that a full 90% of surveyed individuals supported the use of the death penalty on 16 year old offenders in certain serious situations. There is no reason not to believe that similar public support exists today, establishing firmly that no standard has evolved that would hold juveniles above the level of accountability for heinous crimes that we apply to adults.
This court does not begrudge the right of states to freely choose not to exercise capital punishment on juvenile offenders through legislative action. However, there exists no clear indication of an evolved standard that would justify this court prohibiting such punishments in conflict with current state legislation.
VI. Definition of Eight Amendment
The U.S. Constitution's Eighth amendment
states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” A number of state constitutions also
contain the same, or similar, provisions.
It is the responsibility of this court to uphold the intended
significance of this amendment as it was originally conceived by its
framers. The question in this case is
whether the death penalty is prohibited by the Eighth amendment when it applies
to minors who have committed a capital offense; this court finds that it is not.
Justice Lynch defined the Eighth amendment in
1972 as: “A penalty offends the proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment when it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is
inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of
human dignity.” In this case under this
accepted broad definition, (the interpretation was upheld in Stanford v. Kentucky, 1989) it is
evident that the punishment of Simmons is appropriate given the nature of the
crime committed and the threat presented to society by the defendant. The
execution of a convicted murderer, even one who is 17 years of age, does not
seem disproportionate and does not shock the conscience of this court, nor is
our fundamental notion of human dignity offended. In Solem v. Helm 463
This court can not and will not justify
anything less than the death penalty for a cognitively mature juvenile who
commits predetermined murder in this manner. Such a murderer presents a clear
and persistent threat to the population as a whole, is deserving of the most
severe punishment at the disposal of the state due to the serious nature of his
offense, and has been knowingly sentenced to such a fate by an empowered jury
of his peers. The death penalty has always been reserved for those defendants
who most egregiously offend human sensibilities by violently taking the lives
of others, and will continue to be issued in cases such as this until such a
time as the public demands other means for punishing murderers. Christopher
Simmons knowingly committed a horrible murder and it is fitting and appropriate
that he be executed.
VII. Death Penalty as Deterrent
Legal scholars who are proponents of capital
punishment often cite as rational the tendency for the death penalty to deter
one from committing a capital offense. When
the public is aware that the death penalty is present as a punishment for
murder, individuals are deterred from committing such murders. “Scientifically
valid statistical studies—those that examine a period of years, and control for
national trends—consistently show that capital punishment is a substantial
deterrent,” said Senator Orrin Hatch, October 16, 2002, and the common sense of
this court supports that claim. There
is no question that the defendant in this case, Christopher Simmons, planned
and carried out the brutal murder of Shirley Crook on September 9, 1993. Several
witnesses testified at the Simmons trial, most notably Brian Mooney, that they
overheard the defendant Simmons telling others that he could get away with the
murders because he was a juvenile. It is clear that Simmons fully believed that
the gravity of the crime that he had committed was outweighed by his status as
a juvenile, and that the death penalty could not be applied to him assumedly by
the state of
If the death penalty handed down to Christopher
Simmons is overturned as the Missouri Court of Appeals would have, then he will
have been proven correct; a message will be sent that juveniles may commit even
the most heinous of crimes without fear of execution by the state. Had
Christopher Simmons instead known that his actions could result in his
execution and lived in fear of that fact, there is ample reason to believe that
the murder he committed might not have ever taken place. It is therefore this
court’s duty to strongly affirm that the death penalty may be applied to
juveniles in those states that authorize it, such as
VIII. Conclusion
This court upholds the death penalty in general, as there is no indication of evolved public standards that would suggest its reversal to be appropriate or desirable. Prohibiting the execution of juveniles convicted of knowing and heinous murder would depend upon showing that such execution is inherently crueler and more unusual than the execution of adults convicted of similar crimes. However, there is no justification for either a claim of cruelty or unusualness; the use of the death penalty in the case of Christopher Simmons is consistent with the sort of case in which the death penalty is conventionally handed down, and such punishments have been endorsed by a significant portion of the American public through legislation. There is nothing inherently unconstitutional about the execution of convicted juveniles, nor have national standards evolved in such a manner as to justify turning our back on this traditional method of punishment.
As the execution of juvenile
offenders is neither cruel nor unusual, and certainly not both cruel and unusual,
nor have public standards evolved in such a manner as to make such executions
unacceptable, we find that the Supreme Court of Missouri ruled incorrectly when
it applied the Eighth amendment to Roper v. Simmons, and reinstate the sentence of death on
Christopher Simmons for the murder of Shirley Crooke.
Justice Hanson, Dissenting
Initially, as this Court just ruled
in Booth v.
That said, the execution of
juveniles fails 8th amendment analysis even using the standard used
in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US 153 (1976) which permitted executions to resume in
this country because ostensibly there was a state trend supporting the death
penalty. Such a trend does not exist in the case of juvenile executions. In
Thompson v.
In Booth v.
At its core, the state execution of a human being is an act of state violence that is entirely unnecessary. Life imprisonment without parole is certainly one option. The fact that Simmons committed this heinous crime even though there was a death penalty statute speaks to the ability of the death penalty to deter such crime. Most fundamentally, the state purposefully shooting, injecting, or hanging a human being is the ultimate form of punishment; it ends life and no more constitutionally can be said for it than it is cruel and unusual and should not be permitted particularly against 16 and 17 year olds.